Abstract. It is a well known empirical observation that natural axiomatic theories are pre-well-ordered by consistency strength. For any natural theory T , the next strongest natural theory is T`Con T . We formulate and prove a statement to the effect that the consistency operator is the weakest natural way to uniformly extend axiomatic theories.
Introduction
Gödel's second incompleteness theorem states that no consistent sufficiently strong effectively axiomatized theory T proves its own consistency statement Con T . Using ad hoc proof-theoretic techniques (namely, Rosser-style self-reference) one can construct Π 1 sentences ϕ that are not provable in T such that T`ϕ is a strictly weaker theory than T`Con T . Nevertheless, Con T seems to be the weakest natural Π 1 sentence that is not provable in T . Without a mathematical definition of "natural," however, it is difficult to formulate a precise conjecture that would explain this phenomenon. This is a special case of the well known empirical observation that natural axiomatic theories are pre-well-ordered by consistency strength, which S. Friedman, Rathjen, and Weiermann [1] call one of the "great mysteries in the foundations of mathematics."
Recursion theorists have observed a similar phenomenon in Turing degree theory. One can use ad hoc recursion-theoretic methods like the priority method to construct non-recursive Σ 1 definable sets whose Turing degree is strictly below that of 0
1 . Nevertheless, 0 1 seems to be the weakest natural non-recursive r.e. degree. Once again, without a mathematical definition of "natural," however, it is difficult to formulate a precise conjecture that would explain this phenomenon.
A popular approach to studying natural Turing degrees is to focus on degreeinvariant functions; a function f on the reals is degree-invariant if, for all reals A and B, A " T B implies f pAq " T f pBq. The definitions of natural Turing degrees tend to relativize to arbitrary degrees, yielding degree invariant functions on the reals; for instance, the construction of 0 1 relativizes to yield the Turing Jump. Sacks [3] [4] proved that there is no order-preserving solution to Post's Problem. Recall that a function f on the reals is order-preserving if, for all reals, A and B, A ď T B implies f pAq ď T f pBq.
Thanks to Antonio Montalbán for his comments and suggestions.
In [2] , Montalbán and the author proved a proof-theoretic analogue of a negative answer to Sacks' question for order-preserving functions. Let T be a consistent sufficiently strong effectively axiomatized theory in the language of arithmetic, e.g., EA.
1 A function g is monotone if, for all sentences ϕ and ψ, T $ ϕ Ñ ψ implies T $ gpϕq Ñ gpψq (this is just to say that g induces a monotone function on the Lindenbaum algebra of T ). Let rϕs denote the equivalence class of ϕ modulo T provable equivalence, i.e., rϕs :" tψ : T $ ϕ Ø ψu. One of the main theorems of [2] is the following. To state a corollary of this theorem, we recall that ϕ strictly implies ψ if one of the following holds:
(ii) rϕs " rψs " rKs.
Corollary 1.3.
There is no recursive monotone g such that for every ϕ, ϕ^Con T pϕq˘strictly implies`ϕ^gpϕq˘and`ϕ^gpϕq˘strictly implies ϕ.
The Slaman-Steel theorem suggests a strengthening of these results. Recall that a cone in the Turing degrees is a set C Ď R such that for some A, for every B ě T A, B P C. We say that a function f is strictly increasing if, for all A, A ă T f pAq. The following is a special case of a theorem due to Slaman and Steel. (
Montalbán and the author asked whether Theorem 1.2 could be strengthened in the style of the Slaman-Steel theorem, i.e., by showing that all increasing monotone recursive functions that are no stronger than the consistency operator are equivalent to the consistency operator in the limit. In this note we provide a positive answer to this question.
To sharpen the notion of the "limit behavior" of a function, we introduce the notion of a true cone. A cone is any set C such that, for some ϕ, for every ψ, if T`ψ $ ϕ then ψ P C. A true cone is a cone that contains true sentence. In §2 we prove that for any g meeting the conditions of Theorem 1.2, if g produces only Π 1 sentences, then g coincides with the consistency operator on a true cone. (1) There is a true cone C such that for all ϕ P C,
1 EA is a theory in the language of arithmetic (with exponentiation) axiomatized by the Q axioms, recursive axioms for exponentiation, and induction for bounded formulas.
(2) There is a true cone C such that for all ϕ P C,
In §3 we prove that the condition that g is recursive cannot be weakened. More precisely, we exhibit a monotone 0 1 recursive function which vacillates between behaving like the identity operator and behaving like the consistency operator. We conjecture that a similar classification of monotone proof-theoretic operators is possible. Our conjecture is stated in terms of iterated consistency statements. Let ă be an elementary presentation of a recursive well-ordering. We define the iterates of the consistency operator by appealing to Gödel's fixed point lemma.
T $ Con α T pϕq Ø @β ă αCon T`ϕ^C on β T pϕqF or true ϕ, the iterations of Con T form a proper hierarchy of true sentences by Gödel's second incompleteness theorem. We make the following conjecture. According to the conjecture, if an increasing monotone recursive function g that produces only Π 1 sentences is no stronger than Con α T , it is equivalent on a true cone to Con β T for some β ĺ α. This would provide a classification of a large class of monotone proof-theoretic operators in terms of their limit behavior.
The main theorem
Let T be a sound, recursively axiomatized extension of EA in the language of arithmetic. We want to show that T`Con T pϕq is the weakest natural theory that results from adjoining a Π 1 sentence to T . A central notion in our approach is that of a monotone operator on finite extensions of T . Definition 2.1. g is monotone if, for every ϕ and ψ,
Our goal is to prove that the consistency operator is, roughly, the weakest operator for uniformly strengthening theories. Our strategy is to show that any uniform method for extending theories that is as weak as the consistency operator must be equivalent to the consistency operator in the limit. We sharpen the notion "in the limit" with the following definitions. Definition 2.2. Given a sentence ϕ, the cone generated by ϕ is the set of all sentences ψ such that T $ ψ Ñ ϕ. A cone is any set C such that, for some ϕ, C is the cone generated by ϕ. A true cone is a cone that is generated by a sentence that is true in the standard model N.
We are now ready to state and prove the main theorem.
Theorem 2.3. Let g be recursive and monotone such that, for all ϕ, gpϕq is Π 1 . Then one of the following holds:
(1) There is a true cone C such that for all ϕ P C,
Proof. Since g is recursive, its graph is defined by a Σ 1 formula G, i.e., for any ϕ and ψ, gpϕq " ψ ðñ N ( Gpxϕy, xψyq.
Since T is sound and Σ 1 complete, this implies that for any ϕ and ψ,
From now on we drop the corner quotes and write Gpϕ, ψq instead of Gpxϕy, xψyq, trusting that no confusion will arise. We consider the following sentence in the language of arithmetic:
Informally, A says that, for every ϕ, gpϕq implies Con T pϕq. Note that we need to use a partial truth predicate in the statement A since we are formalizing a uniform claim about the outputs of the function g. For any specific output ψ of the function g, T will be able to reason about ψ without relying on the partial truth predicate.
We break into cases based on whether A is true or false. Case 1: A is true in the standard model N. We claim that in this case C :" tϕ : T $ ϕ Ñ Au satisfies condition (2) from the statement of the theorem. Clearly C is a true cone. It suffices to show that for any ϕ P C,
So let ϕ P C and let ψ " gpϕq. We reason as follows.
T`ϕ $ @x@y´`Gpx, yq^True Π1 pyq˘Ñ Con T pxq¯by choice of C.
T`ϕ $`Gpϕ, ψq^True Π1 pψq˘Ñ Con T pϕq by instantiation.
T`ϕ $ Gpϕ, ψq by observation p‹q.
T`ϕ $ True Π1 pψq Ñ Con T pϕq by logic.
T`ϕ`ψ $ Con T pϕq.
Case 2:
A is false in the standard model N. We infer that DϕDψ´Gpϕ, ψq^True Π1 pψq^ Con T pϕq¯.
Thus, there is an inconsistent sentence ϕ such that gpϕq is a true Π 1 sentence. This is to say that gpKq is true. We claim that in this case
satisfies condition (1) from the statement of the theorem. Clearly C is a true cone. It suffices to show that for any ϕ P C,
So let ϕ P C. We reason as follows.
T $ K Ñ ϕ by logic
T $ gpKq Ñ gpϕq by monotonicity T`ϕ $ gpϕq by choice of C This completes the proof. ❑
Recursiveness is a necessary condition
In the proof of Theorem 2.3 we appealed to the recursiveness of g to show that T correctly calculates the values of g, i.e., that for every ϕ and ψ,
In this section we show that recursiveness is a necessary condition for the proof of Theorem 2.3. In particular, we exhibit a monotone operator g which is recursive in 0 1 and produces only Π 1 sentences but does not satisfy the conclusion of Theorem 2.3. In particular, for cofinally many true ϕ, rϕ^gpϕqs " rϕ^Con T pϕqs and for cofinally many true sentences rϕ^gpϕqs " rϕs.
Our proof makes use of the following proposition from [2] .
Proposition 3.1 (Montalbán-W.).
There is an r.e. set A that contains arbitrarily strong true sentences and omits arbitrarily strong true sentences.
We recall the construction of the set A, which is necessary to understand the proof of the theorem. The interested reader can find the proofs that A has the desired properties in [2] .
Let tϕ 0 , ϕ 1 , ...u be an effective Gödel numbering of the language of arithmetic. We describe the construction of A in stages. During a stage n we may activate a sentence ψ, in which case we say that ψ is active until it is deactivated at some later stage n`k.
Stage 0: Numerate ϕ 0 and ϕ 0 into A. Activate the sentences pϕ 0^C on T pϕ 0and p ϕ 0^C on T p ϕ 0 qq.
Stage n+1: There are finitely many active sentences. For each such sentence ψ, numerate θ 0 :" pψ^ϕ n`1 q and θ 1 :" pψ^ ϕ n`1 q into A. Deactivate the sentence ψ and activate the sentences pθ 0Ĉ
on T pθ 0and pθ 1^C on T pθ 1 qq. Our proof also makes use of iterated consistency statements. Let ă be an elementary presentation of ω. We define the iterates of the consistency operator by appealing to Gödel's fixed point lemma.
T $ Con α T pϕq Ø @β ă αCon T`ϕ^C on β T pϕqF or true ϕ, the iterates of Con T form a proper hierarchy of true sentences by Gödel's second incompleteness theorem.
We are now ready to state and prove the theorem. Proof. We define the function g as follows:
gpϕq " # Ź tCon T pψq : ψ P A and T`ϕ $ ψu if rϕs ‰ rKs. K otherwise
Clearly g always produces a Π 1 sentence. It is routine to see that g is monotone.
To show that g is 0 1 recursive, we informally describe an algorithm for calculating g using 0 1 as an oracle. Given an input ϕ, first use 0 1 to determine whether rϕs " rKs. If so, output K. Otherwise, we have to find all sentences ψ P A such that T`ϕ $ ψ. Let's say that ϕ is the n th sentence in our Gödel numbering of the language of arithmetic. By the construction of A, the only sentences in A that T`ϕ proves must have been numerated into A by stage n. So find each of the finitely many sentences that were activated by stage n in the construction of A. 0 1 can determine of any such sentence ψ whether T`ϕ $ ψ. Once all sentences ψ P A such that T`ϕ $ ψ have been found, output the conjunction of their consistency statements.
Note that whenever ϕ P A, we have that rgpϕqs " rCon T pϕqs, whence rϕ^gpϕqs " rϕ^Con T pϕqs.
It suffices to see that for cofinally many true ϕ, T $ ϕ Ñ gpϕq. Let ψ be a true sentence in A. Let's say that ψ was numerated into A at stage n. Let θ ψ be a true sentence that is either the nth sentence in the Gödel numbering of the language or the negation thereof (depending on which is true). Then the next true sentence numerated into A is`ψ^Con T pψq^θ ψ˘. So as long as T & pψ^Con T pψqq Ñ θ ψ , this means that pψ^Con T q R A.
Let's suppose that T & pψ^Con T pψqq Ñ θ ψ and hence that`ψ^Con T pψq˘R A. Then every sentence that is in A and is implied by`ψ^Con T pψq˘is implied by ψ, by the construction of A. Let ϕ :" ψ^Con T pψq. Then rϕ^gpϕqs " rϕ^ľtCon T pψq : ψ P A and T $ ϕ Ñ ψus " rϕ^Con T pψqs " rϕs.
It suffices to show that for cofinally many true sentences ψ P A,
Suppose not, i.e., suppose that there is a true ϕ such that for all true ψ, if both T $ ψ Ñ ϕ and ψ P A, then T $ pψ^Con T pψqq Ñ θ ψ . This means that the true sentences numerated into A after ψ is numerated into A are xψ^Con T pψq, ψ^Con 
